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  CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, STATE REGULATION AND REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW 
 
Harry Arthurs* 
 
Introduction 
 
In his introductory essay, Brian Bercusson notes:    
 
Actors at disparate levels ... are linking up to  form novel regulatory approaches 
... The efficacy of these emerging forms of labour regulation, their democratic 
legitimacy, the goals and values underlying them, and the direction of reform are  
all in dispute.1 
 
The ambition of this  chapter  is to  explore one such “novel regulatory approach” – 
reflexive labour law – and to assess not only its efficacy,  legitimacy and  normative 
aspirations, but also  its intellectual origins,  assumptions and implications.     
 
The growing  corpus of   reflexive labour law scholarship comprises foundational essays 
by Gunther Teubner,2  an extensive body of work  by  Drs.  Rolf  Rogowski and Ton  
                                                 
*    University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University.   I am grateful to Freya 
Kodar and David Doorey for their research assistance, to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada for its financial support, and to the Hugo Sinzheimer Institute and the University of 
Amsterdam, my hosts at a conference on  Reflexive Labour Law in 2001,  where  I presented an earlier 
version of this essay.   
 
1  This volume at p.  -   
  
2  See e.g. G. Teubner,  “The Transformation of Law in the Welfare State” and “After Legal 
Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-regulatory Law” in G. Teubner (ed.) Dilemmas of Law in the 
Welfare State (Berlin/NY: DeGruyter, 1985);  “Industrial Democracy Through Law” in T. Daintith and G. 
Teubner  “Contract and Organization: Legal Analysis in the Light of Economic and Social Theory”  
(Berlin/NY: DeGruyter, 1986);  Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of 
Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (Berlin/NY: DeGruyter, 1987);  State, Law and 
Economy as Autopoietic Systems: Regulation and Autonomy in a New Perspective  (Milan: Giuffrė, 1992) 
(with Alberto Febbrajo); Law as an Autopoietic System (London: Blackwells, 1993).   
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Wilthagen as well as  several volumes edited by them, 3  and  a  number of  books and 
articles  which engage with  their work  and Teubner’s.4      
 
While reflexive law belongs to  a   family of  post-modern socio-legal theories  which  
dispute  the state’s centrality in the  administration of  law’s empire,  it is distinguished 
by several controversial features:   its claim that legal and other social systems are 
closed and autonomous; its demarcation of  system boundaries on the basis of 
functional differentiation rather than stipulated or a priori characteristics; its identification 
of  legal discourse as the trigger for a binary distinction between law and non-law; its 
                                                 
 
3   Their English-language publications include: R. Rogowski and T. Wilthagen, “Reflexive Labour 
Law: An Introduction” in R. Rogowski and T. Wilthagen (eds) Reflexive Labour Law: Studies in Industrial 
Relations and Employment Regulation (Deventer/Boston: Kluwer, 1994); M. Aalders and T. Wilthagen, 
“Moving Beyond Command-and-Control: Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health 
and the Environment”  (1997) 19 Law and Policy  415; R. Rogowski, “Autopoietic Industrial Relations and 
Reflexive Labour Law” in T. Wilhagen (ed.) Advancing Theory in Labour Law and Industrial Relations in a 
Global Context (Amsterdam: North-Holland Press, 1998);  R .Rogowski, “Industrial Relations as a Social 
System” (2000) 7 German Journal of Industrial Relations 97; R. Rogowski,  “The Concept of Reflexive 
Labour Law:  Its Theoretical Background and Possible Applications” in J. Priban and D. Nelken, Law’s 
New Boundaries: The consequences of legal Autopoiesis (Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartnouth, 2001).  
 
4  See e.g. C. Barnard, S. Deakin,  R. Hobbs,  (2005) 'Reflexive law, corporate social responsibility 
and the evolution of labour standards: the case of working time', in O. De Schutter,  and S. Deakin. (eds.) 
Social Rights and Market Forces: Is Open Coordination the Future for European Employment and Social 
Policy? (Brussels: Bruylant, forthcoming) [available at: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp294.pdf]; J. Cohen 
Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm (Princeton U. Press, 2002);  H. Collins “Is there a Third Way 
in Labour Law?” in A. Giddens (ed), The Global Third Way Debate (Blackwell Pub., 2001) 300;  D. 
Doorey,  “Who Made That?  Influencing Foreign Labour Practices Through Reflexive Domestic Disclosure 
Regulation” (2006), 44(1)  Osgoode Hall L.J. [forthcoming]; O. Lobel, “The Renew Deal:  The Fall of 
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn. L.R. 262 esp at 
328 – 343;  D. O’Rourke “Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor 
Standards and Monitoring” (2003) 31 Policy Studies J. 1;  S. Smisman,  “Reflexive Law in Support of 
Directly Deliberative Polyarchy: Reflexive-Deliberative Polyarchy as a Normative Frame for the OMC” in 
O. De Schutter & S. Deakin (eds.), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of 
Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe? (Brussels, Bruylant) [forthcoming]. 
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insistence on the autopoietic - self-referential, self-regulating and self-reproducing - 
character of law; and its novel hypothesis that law acts not so much by imposing itself 
on other social domains directly as by regulating their self-regulatory processes as well 
as its own.5 
 
I will explore some of these ideas in greater detail  below.  First,  however, I will  sketch 
out three case studies of self-regulation in the labour sphere which will hopefully bring 
into focus these features of reflexive law.  Next, I will consider reflexive labour law from 
the perspective of legal theory and political economy, with particular emphasis on the 
marginalization of the state in both domains.  And finally, I will explore the possibility 
that the normative implications of reflexive labour law may turn out to be even more 
important than its descriptive insights 
 
Three case studies  
 
Case study no. 1 - Voluntary codes of conduct6 
                                                 
 
5  See generally  N. Luhmann, Essays on Self-Reference (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1990); G. Teubner (ed.) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Berlin/New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988);  J. Priban and D. Nelken (eds.), Law’s New Boundaries supra note 3.  For a root-and-
branch critique see A. Beck, “Is Law an Autopoietic System?” (1994) 14 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 401. 
 
6  For a fuller development of these ideas, and more extensive references, see H.W. Arthurs, 
“Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime 
of Labour Market Regulation” in J. Conaghan, K.Klare, M. Fischl (eds.) Labour Law in an Era of 
Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and 
“Corporate Codes of Conduct: Profit, Power and Law in the Global Economy” in W. Cragg (ed.)  Ethics 
Codes, Corporations and the Challenges of Globalization (Edward Elgar Press, 2005). 
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As has been widely remarked, many global corporations have recently adopted 
voluntary codes of conduct.  Labour standards feature frequently in these codes, which 
also often encompass environmental practices, commercial honesty, consumer 
protection and integrity in dealings with government officials.  What does this sudden 
upsurge in the use of voluntary codes signify?  Opinions vary: codes represent the 
principled acceptance by corporations of their social obligations; they are a fig leaf used 
to conceal corporate exploitation; they fill a regulatory gap caused by the inability of 
states to regulate the actions of corporations outside their own boundaries; they signal 
an innovative shift in the modalities of market regulation from a pure state-based 
command model to new hybrid models involving a mix of public and private initiatives; 
they are a concession wrung from governments and corporations as a result of 
pressures generated by political and social actors concerned about exploitation and 
abuse; and - perhaps - they are evidence of the existence of autopoietic systems and of 
the ubiquity of  reflexive law. 
 
The use of the term “voluntary” to describe these codes requires some explanation.  
They are typically adopted without compulsion of law; thus in a juridical sense they are 
indeed voluntary.  But in a practical sense, they are generally less so.  They are often 
adopted only after a corporation has been accused of exploiting or abusing its workers, 
either at home or abroad.  Adverse publicity ensues, and the corporation is confronted 
by threats of moral, economic or political sanctions such as consumer boycotts, 
sympathetic industrial action, denial of government loans and procurement contracts, or 
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(infrequently)  legislation barring its goods from market.  If these threats are deemed 
credible, the corporation must respond.  One response is to adopt a “code” which 
declares its commitment to respect fundamental labour rights such as freedom of 
association, a safe work environment and the absence of coercion and discrimination.  
In a variant of this scenario, corporations which are not themselves the immediate target 
of censure or pressure, but are potentially vulnerable to it, may proactively adopt a code 
developed by a sectoral organization, an international agency, a national government, 
or their professional advisors. Or they may adopt a code entirely on their own initiative, 
in an effort to secure whatever market or moral rewards accrue to exemplars of 
corporate social responsibility.  In a final variant, corporations may be drawn into 
collaboration with NGOs in drafting, administering and even monitoring a code.7  To 
reiterate: in these scenarios, codes are “voluntary” in the sense that corporations do not 
adopt them under compulsion of state law.   But of course they are also “non-voluntary”, 
in the sense that they are adopted out of fear of sanctions or hope of reward. 
 
Whether voluntary or not, however, corporate codes are indisputably “corporate”.  That 
                                                 
7    For an overview of codes and their contents see K. Gordon and M. Miyake, Deciphering Codes of 
Corporate Conduct: A Review of their Contents Paris: OECD, Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and 
Enterprise Affairs, Working Papers on International Investment No. 99/2 (1999);  Report of the Working 
Party of the Trade Committee of the Trade Directorate, Codes of Corporate Conduct - An Inventory, 
Paris: OECD TD/TCWP(98)74, 1999.  For a discussion of labour codes in particular, see United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 1994 - Transnational 
Corporations, Employment and the Workplace (New York/Geneva: United Nations, 1994) at 349 ff.; ILO, 
Overview of Global Developments (Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of Trade, 
Report to the International Labour Office Nov. 1998) GB.273/WP/SDL/1 found at www.ilo.org.ch/public/ 
english/20gb/ docs/ gb273/sdl-1.htm; J. Diller “A Social Conscience in the Marketplace?  Labour 
Dimensions of Codes of Conduct, Social Labelling and Investor Initiatives” (1999) 138 International 
Labour Review 99. 
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is to say, their drafting, administration and enforcement reflect the fact that they 
originate in the realm of private, rather than public, regulation.8  This shapes their 
architecture in several important ways.  First, their substantive provisions are typically 
vaguely worded, perhaps to allow for their application in diverse economic, socio-
cultural and legal contexts; as a result, it is difficult to identify clear violations.  Second, 
responsibility for code administration is seldom fixed on any specific corporate officer, 
nor are procedures mandated whereby adherence is promoted or compliance 
monitored; as a result, corporations often fail to publicize codes internally, train their 
employees to respect them, clarify vague language through information bulletins, or 
report on overall code compliance to their boards of directors.9  Third, sanctions for non-
compliance are seldom specified, nor is machinery established whereby sanctions can 
be imposed on non-complying employees, subsidiaries, suppliers or affiliates. Given 
these characteristics, codes often appear to be - and are - ineffectual, if not actually 
counter-productive.10  This is obviously not to suggest that all corporations with codes 
                                                 
8  See generally  M. Priest, “The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation” (1997) 
29 Ottawa Law Review 233; N. Gunningham and J. Rees, “Industrial Self-Regulation: An Institutional 
Perspective” (1997) 19 Law and Policy 364. 
 
9  A recent survey of major Canadian companies doing business abroad discloses that over 85% 
professed to have a written document dealing with corporate ethics relating to labour, environmental and 
business practices, including about 50% which described such statements as “rules of conduct” or 
“guidelines”.  However, over 60% did not train their staff to administer such documents; virtually all those 
which did spent 4 hours per year or less on such training; that only 15-25% of such companies applied 
any aspect of their ethics codes to suppliers;  only 2-12% reported to their Boards of Directors on 
compliance; and  similarly low  rates of Board oversight were exercised even with regard to the firms’ own 
practices.  Bribery stands apart as receiving somewhat more intensive and extensive scrutiny.   KPMG, 
Ethics Survey 2000 - Managing for Ethical Practice http://www.kpmg.ca/english/services/docs/ fas/ 
ethicssurvey2000e.pdf. 
 
10   A. King and M. Lenox, “Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s 
Responsible Care Program” (2000) 4 Academy of Management Journal 698. 
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are guilty of egregious behaviour: only that codes per se do not seem to not seem to be 
an efficient or contributing cause of higher labour standards.11 
 
However, reflexive law makes us sensitive to the possibility that the very appearance of 
a code may be evidence of a pattern of adaptive behaviour, of a learning process which 
over time will reshape the law of the corporation and its workplaces.  Indeed, while I 
have accurately described the first generation of corporate codes, I believe, a second 
generation of codes is said to be emerging.  This second generation is characterized by 
several innovations, designed to give greater credibility to codes, if not actually to 
enhance their effectiveness.  First, transnational advocacy organizations - unions and 
social movements - are claiming a greater role in the formulation and administration of 
codes.  Second, the monitoring or auditing of code compliance has become a discrete 
and increasingly professionalized function, often contracted out to specialist commercial 
or non-profit agencies which operate at arm’s length from the corporation itself.  Third, 
in a few cases, senior management and boards of directors are becoming more heavily 
invested in the exercise: responsibilities are fixed on a compliance officer and the code 
itself becomes a standing item on the directors’ agenda.  Fourth, proactive steps are 
                                                 
11    Of course, this is an empirical question in each case, and therefore likely to involve controversial 
issues of evidence interpretation.  For a rather poignant example of such a controversy, contrast the 
honestly optimistic view of the chair of the Independent Monitoring Council responsible for ensuring 
implementation of Mattel Inc.’s “Global Manufacturing Principles” with the critical comments of the 
representative of an independent monitoring group (Asia Monitor Resource Centre) concerning non-
compliance with those principles in Mattel factories in Thailand.  See S. P. Sethi, “Corporate 
Accountability through International Codes of Conduct - Theoretical Implications and Challenges to 
Cross-Cultural Applications: The Case of Mattel, Inc.” (Sao Paolo: Second World Congress, International 
Society of Business, Economics and Ethics - ‘The Ethical Challenges of Globalization’, July, 2000, 
unpublished) and S. Frost “Factory Rules versus Codes of Conduct: Which Option makes Sense for 
Business?”  (2000) 2:4 Human Rights Dialogue 3 (Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs). 
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being taken to ensure that suppliers and other elements in the production chain do not 
embarrass the company by violating code standards.  Fifth, less frequently, the 
language of the code is re-written to provide more explicit guarantees of a broader 
range of employment standards, occasionally even including a “living wage” or a “fair 
wage”.  And finally, sanctions are built into some code regimes in the form of 
compliance marks or labels whose presence or absence will trigger positive or negative 
consumer reactions. 
 
It is too early to assess what practical consequences - if any - might flow from these 
second generation corporate codes.  However, a third generation may be just over the 
horizon.  One distinguishing feature of third generation voluntary corporate codes would 
be that they cease to be purely “corporate”; states and civil society actors would be 
equal partners or even prime movers in their drafting, promulgation, administration and 
enforcement.12  The other is that they would no longer be purely “voluntary”; they would 
be mandated and enforced by law.  Legislation has been proposed in both the United 
States and Australia which would require that all corporations doing business abroad 
adopt a code, ensure its transparent administration, and be subject to sanctions for non-
compliance in the form of loss of access to government export loan guarantees, 
                                                 
12  R. O’Brien, “NGOs, Global Civil Society and Global Economic Regulation” and R. Mayne, 
“Regulating TNCs: The Role of Voluntary and Governmental Approaches” in Picciotto and R. Mayne, 
Regulating International Business - Beyond Liberalization (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); K. 
Gordon, “Rules for the Global Economy: Synergies between Voluntary and Binding Approaches”  
Unpublished paper, Conference on Corporate Citizenship: Linking CSR business strategies and the 
emerging international agenda (London, 8-9 November, 1999). 
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procurement contracts and other forms of government support.13  And several legal 
scholars and advocates have suggested that corporate codes might be used by courts 
as evidentiary or normative standards designed to establish, diminish or eliminate 
corporate civil or criminal liability for wrongful conduct, even though the codes 
themselves are not directly enforceable as such.14  But so far, neither legal approach 
has made much headway.  
 
If indeed a third generation of codes does emerge, with the imprimatur of state law and 
the involvement of civil society and state - as well as corporate - actors, this would 
represent a genuine innovation. It would also constitute a convenient site for empirical 
investigation of the hypothesis that regulatory efficacy will increase as successive 
generations of codes move up a rising gradient of state involvement.  But we may not 
be able to investigate this hypothesis for some time yet.  State-mandated codes so far 
remain below the horizon and, for reasons canvassed in a subsequent section of this 
                                                 
13    In the United States, see the Corporate Code of Conduct Act, HR 4596 IH (Rep.  McKinney) 
introduced June 7, 2000.  Complying corporations would receive preferential treatment in the awarding of 
federal contracts, participation in trade and development programs and access to export-import credits 
and loan guarantees.  In Australia, a similar Corporate Code of Conduct Bill 2000 was introduced by 
Senator Vicki Bourne as a private member’s bill.   See 
http://search.aph.gov.au/search/parlinfo.ASP?action=browse&Path=legislation/.  Neither is likely to be 
enacted in the foreseeable future. 
 
14   See e.g. for international law  perspectives:  N. Horn, Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for 
Multinational Enterprises (Deventer: Kluwer, 1980).  And for domestic perspectives: see e.g. H.L. Pitt & G. 
Groskuafmanis, “Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of 
Conduct” (1990) 78 Georgetown Law Journal 1559; C.J. Walsh & A. Pyrich, “Corporate Compliance 
Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul” (1995) 47 Rutgers Law 
Review  605 Winter 1995; K. Webb, “Voluntary Approaches, the Environment and the Law: A Canadian 
Perspective” in C. Carraro and F. Lévéque (eds.) Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1999); S. Lu, “Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights 
Through Deceptive Advertising Law”  (2000) 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 603. 
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chapter, they are unlikely to surface soon.  Codes, therefore, remain no more than a 
potentially interesting example of how reflexivity and change may occur in a closed 
normative system. 
 
Case study no. 2 - Ratcheting Labour Standards 
An important recent academic article has proposed that leading corporations should 
commit themselves to “ratcheting labour standards” permanently upward.  The essence 
of this “RLS” proposal is to create a system for  
... monitoring and public disclosure of working conditions [which would] ... create 
official, social and financial incentives for firms to monitor and improve their own 
factories and those of their suppliers. 
 
This would be accomplished by creating  
... an easily accessible pool of information with which the best practices of 
leading firms could be publicly identified, compared and diffused to others in 
comparable settings....The combination of firm-level monitoring and an 
infrastructure for pooling results would help to set provisional minimum standards 
of corporate behaviour, upon which competition - driven by social and regulatory 
pressures - would generate improvements that then “ratchet” standards 
upwards.15   
 
The key features of the RLS proposal - transparency, competition, continuous 
improvement and sanctions (“social and regulatory pressures”) - mark it as worthy of 
attention from students of reflexive labour law.  However, it has already received 
attention - unflattering attention - from labour and academic commentators, who have 
                                                 
15   A. Fung, D. O’Rourke & C. Sabel, “Realizing Labor Standards” (2001)  http://bostonreview. 
mit.edu / BR26.1/fung.html; see also C. Sabel et al “Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation for 
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace” (2000) http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
sabel/papers/ratchPO.html.  
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dubbed it “wishful thinking”. 16  As one such commentator has noted, there is little 
empirical evidence that RLS will in fact produce the desired results: 
...of 61 factories “certified” by SA8000 [a standard such as those proposed by the 
authors of RLS], 34 of them are in China.  In the SA8000 code there is very 
strong language about freedom of association.  If any workers in those 34 
factories were to try and exercise the rights spelled out in the code, they would 
find themselves in jail or an insane asylum.17 
 
At the very least, then, RLS raises in different form issues similar to those posed by the 
“third wave” of voluntary codes: what is the relationship between self-regulation and 
state regulation?  to what extent is it possible to think about RLS in isolation from the 
political economy and legal system of each state in which this approach is to operate?  
For example, if states tolerate or even insist upon a low level of workers’ rights, how 
likely are corporations operating there to adhere to a higher standard even when 
formally committed to RLS?  And, conversely, if states insist on decent labour 
standards, what need is there for RLS?18 
 
The RLS proposal itself is less than clear on these questions.   Its proponents insist that 
RLS “...aims not to deregulate, but rather to redeploy public power in ways that extend 
                                                 
16  M. Levinson, “Wishful Thinking” http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR26.1/levinson.html.   Cf. J. Murray,  
“The Sound of One Hand Clapping? The ‘Ratcheting Labour Standards’ Proposal and International 
Labour Law” (2001), 14 Aust. J. Labour L. 306 
17  Levinson, supra note 16. 
18   A less polemical, recent empirical study of codes operating in four Chinese footwear factories 
which supply footwear to US-based transnational corporations concluded: “the absence of de facto 
supporting institutions and norms at the national and local level in China militated against workers’ 
awareness and support for workers’ rights, as enshrined in labour legislation and the codes of practice.  
For the codes to be effective ... institutional supports in the form of labour law enforcement, some kind of 
legitimate, independent workers’ institution, and procedures for skill enhancement, will be necessary....”  
S. Frenkel, “Globalization, Athletic Footwear Commodity Chains and Employment Relations in Southern 
China” (2001) 22 Organizational Studies 531 at 558. 
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its regulatory reach and wisdom”,  that it is not “a concession to unfettered markets” but 
rather that it will “strengthen the hands and extend the horizons of those who have long 
championed workplace improvements”.19  However, state action is clearly not an 
intrinsic feature of RLS.  On the one hand, RLS rests on the fundamental assumption 
that conventional regulation by the state has proved incapable of achieving its 
objectives, and that it must be replaced or supplemented by new regulatory strategies 
which are more compatible with the political economy of globalization.  For that reason, 
the design of RLS begins not with state initiatives or in state institutions but with private 
initiatives and in the corporate context.  On the other hand, RLS proponents do make 
passing reference to “a more ambitious” model of their project.  In this more ambitious 
model,  they suggest, states might enact legislation requiring domestic firms to 
participate in RLS, might promulgate performance standards and benchmarks 
generated by RLS procedures as their own official labour standards, might “transform 
their own regulatory systems from fixed-rule to ratcheting by requiring domestic firms to 
score high on RLS measures or face sanctions,” and might (one can infer) impose 
sanctions which are of a “regulatory” as well as a “social” character.20 
 
In short, even in the eyes of its proponents, for RLS to become “more ambitious”, it 
must become more state-centred.  But here there is a potential contradiction: state law, 
state institutions, state policies may endanger reflexivity.  This may happen in several 
                                                 
19   Fung et al, supra, note 15 at p. 17. 
20  Ibid at pp. 17-18. 
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ways. State policies may force social actors such as corporations to abandon their 
efforts to ratchet labour standards upwards, as in the Chinese example cited above.  
State regulatory institutions in countries with politically accountable legislatures may 
brush aside corporate regimes of self-regulation which are deemed unambitious, 
insincere or inefficacious.  Or state law may encumber reflexive systems with 
constitutional, procedural and substantive requirements - formal promulgation, clear 
definitions of conduct, predictable sanctions - which are inconsistent with their implicit, 
allusive and inchoate character. 
 
Case study no. 3 - The United Nations Global Compact 
Self-regulation has perhaps reached its apotheosis in the Global Compact signed by the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, more than  fifty of the world’s most powerful 
corporations and a number of unions and social movements.21  Like the RLS proposal, 
the UN Global Compact displays some characteristics of reflexive law.  It is driven by 
the techno-professional discourse of a dialogic community; it is a closed system capable 
of receiving and responding to external stimuli; its success  depends on the willingness 
of participants to engage in a transparent exchange of opinions and information; and is 
designed to regulate not conduct per se but other normative systems, especially those 
embedded in corporate relationships. 
 
The Global Compact declares nine substantive principles - two concerned with human 
                                                 
21  See http://www.unglobalcompact.org. 
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rights, four with the environment and four with labour standards.22  It commits 
signatories to advocate the principles of the Compact to both internal and external 
audiences; to “embrace, support and enact” these  principles “within their sphere of 
influence”; to submit once each year “a concrete example of progress made or a lesson 
learned in implementing the principles”; to promote positive behaviour by their own 
employees; to participate in an exchange of information with other companies; and to 
enter into a dialogue with their social partners concerning further measures.23  
 
Finally, the Compact initiates various processes - a learning forum, policy dialogues, 
company and partnership initiatives and outreach - through which it seeks to promote 
the dissemination of best practices, to encourage their adoption by subscribing 
corporations, and to foster cooperation amongst corporations, governments, unions and 
civil society.24 
 
On its face, the UN Global Compact seems at worst innocuous, and at best a modest 
step towards promoting global corporate accountability.  Indeed, it is likely the most 
amibitious initiative that the Secretary General could hope to undertake, given the 
adamant refusal of many states to accept any measures which might compromise their 
                                                 
22  Freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining (principle 3); 
elimination of forced and compulsory labour (principle 4); effective abolition of child labour (principle 5); 
and elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (principle 6). 
 
23  Global Compact, supra note 21. 
24  Ibid. 
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sovereignty or their competitive edge.25  However, some civil society actors have been 
critical of the Compact from its inception, claiming that corporations have become 
“tangled up in blue” - accorded recognition and prestige through their association with 
the Secretary General and the UN itself.   These critics argue, for example, that 
membership of the Global Compact should not have been extended to corporations 
which have been guilty of egregious abuses of workers, human rights or the 
environment; that the relationship of such corporations to the UN and civil society actors 
should not be described as a “partnership”; that the image of the UN has been sullied by 
its deferential attitude towards these corporations; and that the Compact establishes no 
monitoring or enforcement procedures.26   
 
As the Compact was signed only in mid-2000, and is not yet fully operational, it is 
impossible to evaluate its positive or negative impact.27  However, it does constitute a 
highly visible experiment whose results will contribute to a better understanding of the 
potential and the limits of self-regulation and reflexive labour law.  
                                                 
25  The inability of the UN - for over 35 years - to agree upon even a non-binding code of conduct for 
multinational corporations is some evidence of the difficulties which confronts such measures.  See D. 
Kinley, “Human Rights as Legally Binding or Merely Relevant?” in S. Bottomley and D. Kinley (eds.) 
Commercial Law and Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001).  For an account of other 
difficulties precluding more conventional strategies, see J. Ruggie, “Global_governance.net: The Global 
Compact as a Learning Network” (2001) 7 Global Governance 371.  Ruggie was one of the architects of 
the Global Compact.  
 
26  See Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC), Tangled up in Blue: Corporate 
Partnerships at the United Nations.  http://corpwatch.org/trac/globalization/un/tangled.html (Sept 6, 2000). 
 
27  The early literature - a Symposium on the Global Compact in (2001) 34 Cornell International Law 
Journal      is perforce largely descriptive and speculative.  For a guardedly optimistic view of the Global 
Compact from the perspective of critical legal pluralism, see A. Blackett, “Global Goverance, Legal 
Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct”(2001) 8 
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The significance of self-regulation: several observations in search of an 
hypothesis 
 
These brief sketches of experiments in corporate self-regulation suggest that reflexive 
labour law may be becoming more commonplace, that it may indeed emerge as the 
characteristic legal form of the future.28  This makes it especially important to explore 
why self-regulation and reflexive labour law seem so relevant at this particular moment 
in history.  Note first that many of the post-modern socio-legal theories29 which have 
emerged in recent decades display characteristics associated as well with reflexive law.  
(They also exhibit fundamental differences, reflecting the diversity of intellectual 
provenances and socio-political milieux in which they first appeared.)30  These theories 
in general challenge the conventional “command model” of law; emphasize the 
normative fecundity of social fields; insist on the pluralistic character of legal systems; 
acknowledge the role in law-making, -interpreting and -enforcing of discursive 
communities and other agents not formally mandated by the state; and regard the close 
alignment of state and law as an historical contingency of the modern era.  In various 
                                                                                                                                                             
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 401 at 440 ff. 
 
28   W. Scheuerman,  Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time  (Baltimore/London:  
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)  at 210 ff.   
29  This includes work on jural polycentricity or legal pluralism; Bourdieu’s emphasis on the 
constitution of the “legal field”, studies by Burawoy and Stuart Henry on workplace normativity; the 
governance school which derives from the work of Foucauld; analyses of the emergence of “soft law”, 
especially in transnational relationships; and elements of critical legal studies.  For references to this work 
see H. Arthurs, “Landscape and Memory”: Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and Globalization in T. Wilthagen 
(ed.) Advancing Theory  supra note 3. 
30  See generally David Nelken, “Changing Paradigms in the Sociology of Law” in G. Teubner (ed.) 
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ways, then, they share an attitude of scepticism about the state’s central role in the 
meta-narrative of law.   
 
And now a second observation.  The de-centering of the state is not only an important 
issue for socio-legal scholars.  It is the defining issue of political life in most countries. 
The notion that the state should intervene actively to promote the public interest and 
distribute public goods has been the subject of relentless, often irrational and 
sometimes cogent criticism for almost as long as activist government has been 
advocated and practised.  However, especially since   the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations of the 1980s, this criticism has become particularly strident in the 
English-speaking world.  It has produced disenchantment with the state, and apathy - 
even hostility - towards electoral politics not least, ironically, amongst marginalized 
groups which are the principal clients of state intervention and amongst the political and 
technocratic elites which have been shaping state policy and directing state 
administration. 
 
Disenchantment, hostility and apathy have transformed the discourse of labour law.  It is 
no longer a given that the state can or should ensure minimum labour standards, 
promote countervailing power, redistribute wealth or coordinate corporatist strategies 
which feature labour as a prominent contributor and principal beneficiary. Instead, the 
state is now to be assigned the more mundane tasks of providing infrastructure,  
                                                                                                                                                             
Autopoietic Law – A New Approach to Law and Society  (Berlin/NY: de Gruyter, 1988).   
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supporting human resource development, blaming refugees and immigrants for labour 
market dislocations caused by structural adjustment to technology and globalization, 
and imposing economic and legal discipline on assertive workers.  Likewise, the key 
participants in the formation of labour policy have changed.  Labour lawyers (now 
“employment lawyers”), industrial relations managers (now “human resources” officers), 
trade unionists (still “trade unionists”, but fewer in number) and labour ministries (where 
they still exist) no longer play key roles, if any; economists, corporate lobbyists, central 
bankers, Treasury officials and Ministries of Trade and Industry now control the agenda. 
31   And that agenda itself has changed, both for policy makers and scholars.  
Considerable anti-labour legislation has been enacted by neo-liberal, centrist and social 
democratic governments around the world; progressive reforms are at best a remote 
possibility in most countries;32 and in many benign neglect is the most labour can hope 
for.  In much of North America (though perhaps not in Europe)33 the intense and highly 
politicized debates over workers’ rights which once raged within academic labour law 
have been largely superseded by yet more intense and highly politicized controversies 
over gender, race and disability;34 and within the residual domain of labour law, 
                                                 
31  H.W. Arthurs,   “What Immortal Hand or Eye? – Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of Labour 
Law?”  in G. Davidov and B. Langille,   Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law: Goals and Means in the 
Regulation of  Work (forthcoming, Hart, 2006). 
 
32  See e.g. C. Estlund, “The Ossification of American Labor Law” (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review  
1527.   
 
33  See e.g. A. Supiot, with M..E. Casas et al., Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the 
Future of Labour Law in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
34  For a rather dyspeptic view of this tendency, see M. Finkin, “Reflections on Labor Law 
Scholarship: The Reveries of Monsieur Verog”  (1992) 46 University of Miami Law Review 1101. 
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individual employment law - for practical reasons, the law of privileged categories of 
workers - attracts more attention than collective labour law.   
 
In short, the de-centering of the state has altered power relations.  Most states are now 
unwilling or unable to confront powerful global corporations, which can dis-invest with 
relative ease, which can relocate production to more business-friendly jurisdictions, and 
which can destabilize share prices and national currencies.  In fact, in most states, the 
shift of political power away from labour is accepted, however glumly, as a fact of life.  
Governments confront only sporadic protests against the loss of labour’s entitlements, 
only plaintive pleas for protection against the dislocations which result from the “creative 
destruction” of global capitalism. Even the traumatic anti-globalization protests in 
Seattle, Prague, Genoa, Quebec and elsewhere have not so far produced organized, 
sustained, mass support for laws and policies which protect workers.  For all of these 
reasons, workers - even those who populate the thinning ranks of unions - are reluctant 
to challenge their employers.  This, I suggest, is the context within which we must 
understand the recent proliferation of experiments in corporate self-regulation. 
 
The political economy of a reflexive labour law system: voluntary codes as a test 
case  
 
Against this background, one may ask:  if socio-legal theory and political economy are 
being transformed in the same moment, in the same direction, does one have 
something to do with the other, and if not, what does their coincidental convergence 
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imply for an understanding of reflexive labour law? 
 
In an important recent piece, Rogowski argues that “... a major function of reflexive law 
is to stimulate and instigate self-reflection and self-regulation in other social 
systems.....35  Taking the three episodes of self-regulation described above as 
examples of reflexive labour law operating in this way, we can next explore what 
Rogowski describes as his “research hypotheses”, as trends which he detects in the 
regulation of labour and employment conflicts: 
 
 * the emergence of increasingly specialized and autonomous labour 
tribunals, which become the primary locus of innovation in the labour law 
system 
* enhanced proceduralisation of labour law, in part reflecting a growing 
disenchantment with instrumentalism, formalization and materialization 
 * self-regulation leading to mutual recognition amongst the multiple systems 
of social ordering which impinge on the workplace, with a view to 
facilitating their autonomy and self-reproduction and with a commensurate 
decline in judicial regulation.36 
 
Rogowski does not suggest, of course, that these are the only possible manifestations 
                                                 
35  Rogowski in Wilthagen (ed.) Advancing Theory,  supra note  3, at 73-74. 
36  Ibid. at p. 74-77. 
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of reflexivity in labour law whether in its conflictual or non-conflictual aspects.  Nor does 
he have much to say specifically about corporate codes or other forms of corporate self-
regulation.  Nonetheless, the three case studies summarized above - of corporate 
codes, of RLS and of the UN Global Compact - generally do support Rogowski’s 
“research hypotheses”.  However, in each case one must enter a serious caveat. 
 
It is true that voluntary code-based systems are totally or largely “autonomous”, that 
they are closed systems and that tribunals associated with them - though rare - are 
indeed highly specialized.  But there is little evidence that code-based systems actually 
produce innovation, except to the extent that by masking or cosmeticizing the decline of 
state labour law they help to facilitate and normalize the shift of power from unions and 
workers to employers. 
 
As Rogowski predicts, these new regimes of corporate self-regulation - unlike state law 
- are often neither rational nor instrumental nor formal in their operation and effects.  
Their mandates tend to be expressed only in vague and modest aspirational terms; their 
capacity to initiate action or pursue complaints is circumscribed; their remedial powers 
are negligible or non-existent; their professional character is typically underdeveloped; 
their activity levels are low; and their capacity or ambition to actually shape the conduct 
of the corporations which promulgate them appear to be minimal.  Consequently, as 
near as anyone can tell, they have produced little change in the workplace.37 
                                                 
37  In fairness, while claims and counter-claims abound concerning the efficacy or inefficacy of self-
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To compensate, as Rogowski points out, these regimes are often heavily 
“proceduralized”, in the sense that they seek to achieve their objectives by emphasizing 
transparency, the promotion of cooperation and the dissemination of best practices.  
Their proceduralism is fraught with great symbolic significance.  Performances of the 
rituals of self-regulation - the well-publicized adoption of a code, for example, or the 
blessing conferred on the exercise by senior government officials, the undertaking of 
annual compliance audits, the occasional solemn exorcism of an offending contractor, 
the publication of self-congratulatory reports - tell us a great deal about the values and 
interests which shape labour market regulation today.38  They remind us that states and 
their voters seem content that corporations should create and administer their own 
standards, that they should be trusted and admired for their conscientious behaviour, 
and that while workers should benefit from such behaviour, they should play  no role  in 
shaping or censuring it.  And they remind us, as well, that to the extent that reflexivity is 
accomplished by such symbolic strategies, we must ask ourselves what are its 
prospects for improving on the outcomes achieved by more conventional regulatory 
regimes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
regulatory regimes, the literature does not provide much empirical evidence one way or the other.  The 
most sophisticated empirical study to date, however, concludes that companies which have subscribed to 
an code of self-regulation in the US Chemical Industry have a worse environmental record than those 
which did not.  See A. King and M. Lenox, supra note 10. 
 
38  Compare A. Hyde, “Labor Law as Political Symbol - A Critical Study of Labor Legislation” in 
Ragowski and Wilthagen (eds.) Reflexive Labour Law, supra note 3 at 173. 
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Rogowski hypothesizes that workplaces are increasingly regulated by multiple regimes - 
including “company procedures and other mechanisms of self-regulation” - which 
contribute to legal complexity, and ultimately to the “juridification of social regulations”.39  
Because these multiple regimes interact with but do not control each other, he 
suggests, state courts tend to concentrate on the necessary task of resolving conflicts 
amongst them rather than regulating employers and workers directly.  A reasonable 
hypothesis: but what does it imply? 
 
On the one hand, courts may use state laws of general application or broad concepts 
such as “jurisdiction” to mediate inter-systemic conflicts by limiting the autonomy of one 
system or enlarging that of another.  In given circumstances, this may protect workers’ 
rights and limit corporate power.  Or courts may use concepts such as “due process” or 
“reasonableness” to ensure that all systems - state or private - conform to minimal 
standards of fairness.  Again, in given circumstances, workers may be the beneficiaries.  
However, even such well-meant curial mediation may undermine or over-burden the 
fragile procedures, doctrines and discourses of reflexive workplace systems and render 
them incapable of performing the protective functions for which they were originally 
designed.40  On the other hand, when courts decide to simply take a hands-off attitude 
                                                 
39  Rogowski in Priban and Nelken (eds.) , Law’s New Boundaries  supra note  3 at 191 ff.   
40   H. Arthurs, “Protection Against Judicial Review” (1983)  43 Rev. du Barreau 277, reprinted in 
C.I.A.J., Judicial Review of Administrative Rulings  (Montreal: Editions Yvon Blais, 1984); H. Arthurs, “The 
New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of Labour Arbitration” (1999) 7 
Can. Employment & Labour Law Journal 45. 
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to reflexive regimes, the result can also be prejudicial to workers.41  Everything depends 
on the nature of the systems in question. 
 
Likewise, courts may decide to attempt to resolve inter-systemic conflicts not by 
adjusting reflexive workplace regimes to conform to the mediating principles of state 
law, but rather by mobilizing the power of state law to reinforce the values and 
assumptions of those reflexive regimes. For example, as noted earlier, courts might 
decide to hold corporations liable under state criminal, tort, contract or regulatory law for 
violations of their own codes of conduct.42  Or they might actually mandate the creation 
of new reflexive systems of self-regulation, which would operate under court auspices 
on an ongoing basis,43   much as legislatures did in encouraging or requiring the 
practice of grievance arbitration in North America.  Again, in terms of the consequences 
for workers, everything depends on the quality of those systems. 
 
                                                 
41   For example, several recent U.S. Supreme court decisions have held that employees must 
honour provisions in their employment contracts which require them to arbitrate statutory claims against 
their employer rather than seek recourse through government agencies. K Stone, “Mandatory Arbitration 
of Individual Employment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s” (1996) 73 Denver University 
Law Review 1017; K. Stone, “Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal Arbitration Act” 
(1999) 77 North Carolina Law Review 77. 
 
42  See supra note 12. 
43  An American federal district court has been asked to issue a consent decree approving the 
settlement of litigation by some 50,000 Asian migrant workers against a group of garment manufacturers 
in the Marianas, an offshore U.S. dependency.  The proposed decree would mandate the adoption of a 
code of conduct to prevent continuation of egregious employment practices by the employers, require that 
the code contain effective monitoring, complaint and remedial procedures, and place the whole 
arrangement under the ongoing surveillance of specially-trained court monitors.  For a history of the 
litigation, see Sweatshop Watch, Summary of the Saipan Sweatshop Litigation, 
http://igc.org/swatch/marianas/summary10_00.html. 
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It seems clear, then, that Rogowski is right in his fundamental insight that the existence 
of normative pluralism raises issues of legal complexity and internormativity which in 
turn invite mediation by state courts.  But it is now important to add that there is no 
single set of appropriate organizing principles which must inform such mediation, that 
there is no way of predicting whether mediation will work in favour of particularistic, 
indigenous or reflexive law rather than in favour of state laws of general application, and 
that there is no necessary assurance that the resulting social outcomes are likely to be 
favour workers rather than employers. 
 
From  Rogowski’s perspective,  systemic mediation is driven by a tendency towards the 
reduction of  legal complexity.  However, as he acknowledges, the reduction of legal 
complexity may amount in practice to deregulation of the labour market.  This is clearly 
a matter of concern to Rogowski who distinguishes “reflexive deregulation” of the 
workplace from  that driven by neo-liberal ideology.  Indeed, Rogowski’s own preference 
is for an approach which “ ... pursues not only economic but also wider social goals, ... 
[which] tries to strike a balance between employer demands of reduced levels of 
protection and the employees’ interests to find and keep a secure job”.44  But this 
formulation is important.  It suggests that while proponents of the theory of theory of 
reflexive law begin by stating that their aims are purely descriptive or analytical, they 
themselves acknowledge that in practice reflexive labour law systems may produce 
effects with real-life political, social or moral consequences which they regard as 
                                                 
44  Rogowski in Priban and Nelken (eds.) supra note 3 at 192. 
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undesirable.  I will return to this point in my conclusion. 
 
Finally, as Rogowski remarks, reflexive systems are not only autonomous in their 
operation; they have an extensive capacity for self-reproduction.45  States have so far 
generally not captured them; they proliferate; they mutate in successive generations; 
and they maintain remarkable isolation from the adjacent state systems, whose 
incursions they are designed to forestall.  They operate, in other words, in much the 
same way as lethal viruses and dangerous new drug-resistant strains of bacteria.  Of 
course, reflexive systems of labour law are not inherently lethal or dangerous to the 
well-being of workers and the health of unions.  But it is not irrelevant that the 
proliferation of regimes of corporate self-regulation - of reflexive labour law regimes, in 
other words  -  seems  to have no necessary connection with an improvement in labour 
standards for workers employed by corporations which have adopted codes of conduct, 
committed themselves to “ratcheting” standards upwards through the sharing of best 
practices, or signed on to the UN Global Compact. 
 
Even more cynical interpretations are possible.  Perhaps there is a connection between 
reflexive labour law and enhanced labour standards.  Reflexivity, after all, implies 
learning.  In  the new labour law dispensation of corporate self-regulation, employees 
are indeed learning: to accept that the state cannot or will not protect them; to applaud 
employers whose adoption of voluntary codes certifies that they are responsible 
                                                 
45  Rogowski in Wilthagen (ed.) supra note 3 at 71. 
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corporate citizens; to subject themselves willingly to governance by those codes and, by 
extension, by the other normative systems promulgated by their employer; and 
ultimately to abandon the notion that they can shape their own fate by supporting unions 
or political parties committed to aggressive state regulation of the labour market. 
 
Conclusion: beyond reflexivity, beyond labour law 
 
The three sketches of corporate self-regulation which introduce this essay do not so 
much challenge the hypotheses of reflexivity as expose their potential dark side.  
However, one should not criticize theories of reflexivity for what they do not claim and 
therefore do not accomplish.  As noted, Rogoswki and Wilthagen maintain that the 
theory of reflexivity is intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive.46  That is to 
say, it is meant to help us better understand socio-legal phenomena, not to enlist 
support for specific regulatory strategies or programs, much less for ultimate political or 
social values.  To that extent, I have been somewhat unfair in stressing that reflexive 
labour law may express, legitimate and even reinforce corporate power.  On the other 
hand, for several reasons, it is important for reflexive labour lawyers to come to grips 
with the issue of power more explicitly than they have done so far. 
 
Rogowski aptly cites Hegel’s famous aphorism that “... philosophy [a]s the thought of 
the world ... appears only at a time when actuality has gone through its formative 
                                                 
46  Rogowski and Wilthagen (eds.) supra note 3 at 7-8. 
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process and attained its completed state .... [T]he owl of Minerva begins its flight only 
with the onset of the dusk....”47  The idea of reflexivity, I wish to suggest, arrives at the 
dusk of  postwar optimism about the potential of electoral politics and the activist state, 
about social democracy, about the emancipatory potential of  collective workers action, 
about law’s rationality and practical attainments. It would therefore be helpful if  reflexive 
labour law had more to say about the events which characterize this neo-liberal dusk, 
and about what Minerva’s owl portends for relations of power in the workplace. 
 
This shortcoming is no reason to resist reflexive labour law as a descriptive or 
explanatory theory.  Indeed,  the crisis of  theorization in industrial relations, in law 
generally, and in labour law in particular amply justifies all attempts to develop new 
scientific critiques and new theoretical perspectives.48  Reflexive labour law clearly 
responds to this crisis.  However, let us revisit the context.   Like other theories 
associated with post-modernity, reflexive law assumes - but does not insist - that the 
state and its legal system are historically contingent and increasingly irrelevant.  Fair 
enough: but note that theories of neo-liberalism and globalization also dismiss the state 
and its legal system - or at least the social democratic state and transformative legal 
strategies.  Is this mere coincidence?  Or is there a connection - consequential, 
ideological or epistemological - between reflexive law and neo-liberalism? 
 
                                                 
47  G. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of  Right (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
at 23 (A. Wood ed., originally published 1820) cited by Rogowski in Wilthagen (ed.) supra note  3 at 67. 
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At the least, it seems that the postmodern view of the state and the reflexive analysis of 
law may become self-fulfilling prophecies.  Theories such as reflexivity are not 
parthenogenic: they do not create themselves, write themselves, disseminate 
themselves.   They are produced by human intelligence and propagated by human 
agents - by scholars like us.  But scholars like us are also - inescapably - political 
actors: we write books and articles and shape the thinking of students, lawyers and 
judges; we advocate public policies and advise governments and civil society 
organizations; we prepare legal opinions and draft legislation.  My concern is that our 
scientific work will - even against our intentions - come to affect our political work, so 
that our descriptive hypotheses about how law works will become prescriptive.  After all, 
if we believe in autopoiesis, what can we say about legislation or right-based litigation or 
other purely instrumental approaches to law?  If we believe in legal reflexivity, how can 
we be critical, much less cynical, about corporate self-regulation which, after all, is a 
text-book example of the phenomenon?  At some point, then, what we believe as 
scholars is likely to impinge upon what we do as political actors.  When it does, the 
activist state is going to suffer the defection of some of its most influential and 
knowledgeable supporters - a loss it can ill afford in this era of neo-liberal ascendancy. 
 
Finally, in this scenario, it is not just the state and its legal system which are being 
transformed by the simultaneously assault of neo-liberalism and post-modern 
theorizing. The metaphoric death of the state is likely to have the same disconcerting 
                                                                                                                                                             
48  H. Arthurs, “‘Landscape and Memory’: Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and Globalization” in 
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effects on labour lawyers and scholars as the death of God had on theologians and 
members of religious orders.  In the end, some of us may cling mindlessly to the old 
church; others may abandon labour law entirely; still others may embrace new 
economic faiths, new political values, new scientific revelations or new legal rituals.  Will 
reflexive labour law rise to the challenge of this new era to provide us with a narrative of 
workplace normativity which is not only helpful in a descriptive and explanatory sense, 
but which provides a basis for evaluation and critique?  And will those of us who  
persevere with scholarship in the field be able to build again - with new insights, in new 
historical circumstances - a new regime of state labour law which speaks social justice 
to corporate power?  Or does the very formulation of these questions mark me as 
someone who has failed to grasp the fundamental insights of reflexive labour law? 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
Wilthagen  note 3  at 21 ff.  
